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§ 5.1. Joint Ventures.* A business entity may assume a variety of 
organizational forms. 1 One such organizational structure is commonly 
known as the "joint venture."2 Although courts from various jurisdic. 
tions have attempted to delineate the specific attributes which constitute a 
joint venture,3 there is no uniform definition of this structure.4 During the 
Survey year in Shain Investment Co., Inc. v. Cohen,s the Massachusetts 
Court of Appeals addressed the problem of defining the characteristics 
which establish the existence of a joint business venture. 
The plaintiffs in Shain acquired a one-tenth interest in Investment 
Funds, Inc. ("IF"), a company which designed, financed and managed 
nursing homes, apartments and condominiums.6 In return for this inter-
est, the plaintiffs agreed to aid IF in obtaining capital and corporate 
guarantees.? The plaintiffs later entered into a written agreement with the 
defendant Cohen, whereby the defendant purchased one-third of the 
plaintiffs' interest in IF.S Under this agreement, the defendant was enti-
tled to one-third of the plaintiffs' income and profits resulting from the 
t Jane Stiles, James Kennedy. 
* Jane Stiles, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.1. 1 See generally H. Henn, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES 35- 106 (2d ed. 1970). 
2 2 S. Williston, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 318, 318A (3d ed. 1959); see 
also Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Origins, Nature and Development, 9 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1960); 
Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956). 
3 See, e.g., Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App. 2d 152, 160-62, 115 P.2d 613, 618 (1941); 
Fangmeyer v. Reinwald, 200 Neb. 120,131,263 N.W.2d 428,434 (1978); Ford v. McCue, 
103 Ohio 498, 127 N.E.2d 209, 219 (1955). 
4 Jaeger, supra note 2, at 5-6; Note, Nebraska Supreme Court Refuses to Disturb Jury 
Determination of a Sharecropping Arrangement as Constituting a Joint Venture-
Fangmeyer v. Reinwald, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353,357 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Fangmeyer v. Reinwald]; see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mass. 
1981) (The joint venture theory is one of the most fluid concepts in all of the law). 
s 15 Mass. App. Ct. 4, 443 N.E.2d 126 (1982). 
6 [d. at 5, 443 N.E.2d at 128. In this agreement, the plaintiffs also acquired a one-tenth 
interest in the net earnings of Roberts & Co., and an option to purchase ten percent of the 
stock of Medical Services Corp. of America. Both of these companies were engaged in 
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plaintiffs' prior agreement with IF.9 The defendant also assumed an 
obligation for one-third of the potential losses and obligations arising 
under the agreement between the plaintiffs and IF.IO 
Following the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, IF 
filed for bankruptcy. I I The plaintiffs sued the defendant to collect one-
third of the losses and expenses incurred due to their agreement with IF.12 
The defendant denied liability for any such losses, claiming that his 
agreement with the plaintiffs create a partnership or joint venture, and, 
consequently, that the plaintiffs owed him a fiduciary duty.13 The defen-
dant asserted that because the plaintiffs violated this fiduciary duty by 
mismanaging the shared investment, the defendant was not liable to 
them for the resultant 10ssesY The superior court granted the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment, ruling that no genuine issue of material 
fact had been presented to support the existence of either a partnership or 
joint venture. IS The Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the decision 
of the superior court,16 finding that the agreement between the plaintiffs 
and the defendant was "sufficiently similar" to ajoint venture to create a 
fiduciary relationship between the parties, and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 17 
In reaching its decision, the Appeals court first rejected the defendant's 
contention that the agreement at issue created a partnership .18 The court 
stated that the intent of the parties was essential in detellmining whether 
an agreement established either a partnership or a joint venture .19 Since 
the agreement did not provide for co-ownership of a business, the court 
found that there was no partnership. 20 
The court next considered whether the relationship between the plain-
tiffs and defendant constituted a joint venture. 21 In attempting to articu-
late the characteristics of ajoint venture, the court recognized that exist-
9 [d. at 5-6, 443 N.E.2d at 128. The defendant also acquired a one-third share of the 
plaintiff's interest in Roberts & Co. and Medical Services of America, which the plaintiff 
had secured in his prior agreement with IF. See supra note 6. 
10 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 6, 443 N.E.2d at 128. It was provided that Cohen would be 
responsible for one-third of "all payments, expenditures, losses, duties and obligations, 





15 [d. at 6, 443 N.E.2d at 129. 
16 [d. at 13, 443 N.E.2d at 132. 
17 /d. at 11-12,443 N.E.2d at 131-132. 
18 /d. at 7, 443 N .E.2d at 129. 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 [d. at 7-11, 443 N.E.2d at 129-31. 
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ing precedent did not provide a clear definition.22 The court noted, how-
ever, that a joint venture may be distinguished from a partnership in that a 
joint venture is usually limited to a single enterprise, while a partnership is 
organized to transact a general business.23 The Shain court listed eight 
factors to be considered in determining whether a joint venture exists. 
These eight factors are: (1) an agreement by the parties manifesting their 
intention to associate for joint profit not amounting to a partnership or a 
corporation; (2) a contribution of money property, effort, knowledge, 
skill, or other assets to a common undertakin~; (3) a joint property 
interest in all or parts of the subject matter of the venture; (4) a right to 
participate in the control or management of the enterprise; (5) an expecta-
tion of profit; (6) a right to share in profits; (7) an express or implied duty 
to share in losses; and (8) a limitation to a single undertaking, or possibly 
a small number of enterprises.24 
In light of these eight factors, the court found that the agreement 
between the plaintiffs and the defendant established ajoint venture. 25 The 
court characterized the agreement as embodying a "limited arrangement 
in which the parties pooled capital and risk to obtain mutual advantage 
from an investment opportunity. "26 The specific characteristics of the 
agreement at issue, the court found, "obviously" included all the relevant 
factors except the fourth, the right to participate in the control or man-
agement of the enterprise.27 The court recognized this factor as an essen-
tial element of ajoint venture. 28 Although the agreement did not expressly 
give the defendant a legal right to manage the investment, the court 
determine that the terms of the agreement should be construed to re-
quire that the plaintiffs involve the defendant in decisions affecting their 
mutual investment.29 According to the court, the duties, obligations and 
potential liability imposed on the defendant by the agreement, as well as 
the implicit understanding of the parties, gave the defendant rights far 
greater than those held by a mere passive investor.3o The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the fourth factor of its test was essentially satisfied, 
and the agreement at issue was "sufficiently similar" to ajoint venture to 
create a fiduciary relationship between the parties.31 
The court in Shain recognized that participants in a joint venture stand 
22 [d. at 7. 443 N .E.2d at 129. 
23 [d. 
24 [d. at 8-9. 443 N.E.2d at 130. 
25 [d. at 10-11,443 N.E.2d at 131. 
26 /d. at 8, 443 N .E.2d at 129. 
27 [d. at 9, 443 N .E.2d at 130. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. at 10,443 N.E.2d at 130-131. 
30 /d. at 10-11, 443 N .E.2d at 130-131. 
31 [d. at 11, 443 N.E.2d at 131. 
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in the same fiduciary relationship as do members of a partnership.32 The 
court determined, however, that it could not reach the issue of whether 
the plaintiffs in fact violated the fiduciary duties arising from the joint 
venture because the trial court had erroneously decided that no fiduciary 
relationship existed.33 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs had violated their 
fiduciary duties and, if so, whether such violations caused the resulting 
losses.34 
The Shain court's characterization of a joint business venture is consis-
tent with earlier Massachusetts case law. The Shain case adopted the 
distinction articulated in prior Massachusetts decisions which recognized 
that a joint venture and a partnership are two separate forms of business 
organization.35 Although this separate classification has been criticized by 
courts and commentators on the basis that a joint venture and a partner-
ship are indistinguishable,36 a joint venture remains a distinct form of 
business organization in Massachusetts.37 
Massachusetts courts, although recognizing the separate existence of a 
joint venture,38 had at one time expressly declined to provide a com-
prehensive definition of that relationship.39 More recent court decisions 
prior to Shain, however, had begun to develop more fully the attributes of 
a joint venture.40 These developments were summarized in Payton v. 
32 Id.; see Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,164 N.E. 545 (1925); see generally Note, 
Imposition of a Constructive Trust Based Upon a Breach of a Fiduciary Duty in Joint 
Venture Situations, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 229 (1981). 
33 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 12, 443 N.E.2d at 131-32. 
34 Id. 
35 Although ajoint venture resembles a partnership, these two forms ofbusiness'oraniza-
tion have been distinguished primarily because a joint venture usually is .limited to a single 
enterprise, while a partnership is organized to transact a general business. See Cardullo v. 
Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N .E.2d 843, 845 (1952); See also Jaeger, supra note 2, at 17-23. 
36 See, e.g., Jaeger, supra note 2, at 2-3; Taubman, supra note 2, at 642; Wheatley v. Carl 
Halvorson, Inc., 213 Or. 228, 235, 323 P.2d 49, 56-57 (1958). 
37 See, e.g., Eastern Elec. Co. v. Taylor Woodrow Blitman Constr. Corp., 1981 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 110, 115,414 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27; Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 
105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952); cf. Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D. 
Mass. 1956). 
38 See Berwin v. Cable, 313 Mass. 431,435,47 N.E.2d 951, 953-54; Edgerly v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society, 287 Mass. 238, 240-41, 191 N.E. 415, 417 (1934); Ross v. Burrage, 
233 Mass. 439, 448, 124 N.E. 267, 270-71 (1919). 
39 Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952); Mendelsohn v. 
Leather Mfg. Co., 326 Mass. 226, 233, 93 N.E.2d 537, 541 (1950). A general definition may 
be found in Taubman, supra note 2, at 641, 643-49. 
40 See, e.g., Shinberg v. Garfinkle, 361 Mass. 109, 115, 278 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1972); 
Lawless v. Melone, 350 Mass. 440, 442-43, 214 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1966); Air Technology 
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 625, 199 N.E.2d 538, 547 (1964); Wilson v. 
Jennings, 344 Mass. 608, 614-15, 184 N.E.2d 642, 645-47 (1962). 
4
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Abbott Labs. 41 In Payton, the federal district court stated that the impor-
tant elements of a joint venture include an agreement to associate in 
business activity, sharing of profits and of losses, joint control of the 
objectives of the undertaking, and, finally, contributions by both parties 
to the assets of the venture.42 These factors were relied upon by the 
Massachusetts courts in deciding whether a business organization was a 
joint venture. 43 The Shain court expanded the characteristics bearing 
upon the existence of ajoint venture.44 In addition to the factors identified 
in Payton, the Shain court recognized that parties involved in a joint 
venture may share both a property interest in the subject matter of the 
venture and an expectation of profit.45 Furthermore, according to the 
Shain court, the parties' association must be limited to a single or small 
number of undertakings.46 In all, the Shain court compiled eight charac-
teristics which aid in recognizing ajoint business venture.47 Accordingly, 
the decision in Shain provides the first comprehensive statement of the 
factors Massachusetts courts will consider in determining whether ajoint 
business venture exists. 
Shain is also important as an indication that Massachusetts courts will 
continue to employ a case-by-case approach to evaluate the existence of a 
particular form of business .organization.48 Shain reiterated the common 
theme that the intent of contracting parties to associate in a particular 
fashion is controlling.49 In Shain, the court found that ajoint venture and, 
41 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981). 
42 Id. at 1036; see also, Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. Mass. 1956); 
Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 625, 199 N.E.2d 538, 547 (1964); 
Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (1952). 
43 See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981); Patriot Gen. Life 
Ins. Co. v. CFC Inv. Co., 1981 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1001, 1004,420 N.E.2d 918, 920; 
Lawless v. Melone, 350 Mass. 440, 442-43, 214 N .E.2d 881, 882 (1966); Air Techology Corp. 
v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 625,199 N.E.2d 538, 547 (1964); Wilson v. Jennings, 
344 Mass. 608,614-15, 184 N.E.2d 642, 645-47 (1962); Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 
105 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (1952). 
44 15 Mass. App. Ct. 4, 8-9, 443 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1982); see generally Note, Fangmeyer 
v. Reinwald, supra note 4, at 357. 
45 Id. 
46 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 8-9, 443 N .E.2d at 130. The Shain court is thus substantially in 
accord with the factors identified in 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, at § 318A. 
47 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 8-9, 443 N .E.2d at 130. 
48 See, e.g., Eastern Elec. Co. v. Taylor Woodward Blitman Constr. Corp., 1981 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 110, 118,414 N.E.2d 1023, 1027-28 (1981); Air Technology Corp. v. 
General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 624, 199 N.E.2d 538, 546-48 (1964); see generally, Note, 
Fangmeyer v. Reinwald, supra note 4, at 358. The existence of a joint venture is, in most 
circumstances, a question for jury determination. 
49 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 7, 443 N.E.2d at 129; see Shinberg v. Garfinkle, 361 Mass. 109, 
114,278 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1972); Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843,845 
(1952). 
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therefore, a fiduciary duty existed, despite the fact that the agreement did 
not provide expressly for joint control of the shared investment.5o In-
stead, the court looked to the reasonable expectations of the parties.51 
Thus, Shain suggests that the terms of an agreement will not be strictly 
construed, but rather that the court will examine the inteht and expecta-
tions of the parties in order to determine whether the eight factor test has 
been satisfied. 
The court's decision in Shain did not eliminate all ambiguities regarding 
the definition of a joint venture. Left unresolved by Shain is the relative 
weight each factor is to be accorded. The court did state that mutual 
control was an "essential element" of ajoint venture.52 Other courts have 
stated that "profit-sharing and joint control are the sine qua non of the 
joint venture."53 It is unclear from the court's analysis, however, what 
importance a court should accord to the existence or non-existence of any 
particular factor in the ultimate determination of whether a joint venture 
exists between two parties. 
The Shain court also failed to state whether all eight enumerated factors 
must be present before a joint venture can be established. Although the 
court specifically stated that these factors "may" bear upon the recogni-
tion of a joint venture,54 the court went on to confirm the existence of 
each factor in the particular circumstances of the case at bar. 55 Although 
at least one Massachusetts court has stated that the "absence of anyone 
of these elements may not be fatal to establishing the existence of a joint 
venture,"56 the Shain decision did not address the combination of charac-
teristics sufficient to define a joint venture. Whether a joint venture can 
exist in the absence of certain of the factors identified in Shain is a 
question to be resolved in future litigation. 
§ 5.2. Limited Partners-Obligation to Make Capital Contributions. * 
Limited partnerships have enjoyed increased popularity in recent years, 
50 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 10-11,443 N.E.2d at 130-31; see also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 
F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (D. Mass. 1981); Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. 
Mass. 1956); but see Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 625 n.15, 
199 N .E.2d 538, 547 n.15 (1964) (equal joint control may not be necessary). 
51 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 10-11,443 N.E.2d at 130-31. 
52 ld. at 9, 443 N.E.2d at 130; see also 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, at § 318A. 
53 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (D. Mass. 1981); (Ompare Patriot Gen. 
Life Ins. Co. v. CFC Inv. Co., 1981 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1001, 1004,420 N.E.2d 918, 920 
(1981) Goint business venture did not exist), with Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. 
Supp. 253, 256 (D. Mass. 1956) (existence of these factors led to the finding of a joint 
venture). 
54 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 9, 443 N .E.2d at 130. 
55 !d. at 9-11, 443 N.E.2d at 130-31. 
56 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (D. Mass. 1981). 
* James M. Kennedy, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
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in large measure because the unique features of the limited partnership 
make it a more attractive vehicle for developing income tax shelters than 
the traditional corporate form of organization.! In contrast to the corpora-
tion, in which income is taxed at both the corporate and shareholder 
levels,2 the limited partnership acts as a conduit, allowing the income and 
losses of the partnership to flow through to the individual partners for tax 
purposes.3 Similar to corporate shareholders, however, limited partners 
enjoy limited liability for the actions of the entity;4 only general partners 
bear unlimited liability. 5 
Although limited liability, combined with tax benefits, has attracted 
investors to the limited partnership, concern for the rights of third parties 
who deal with partnerships has prompted states to regulate limited 
partnerships in a manner similar to corporations.6 Thus, unlike a general 
partnership, which can be created through the actions of the general 
partners,? limited partnerships and corporations must be formally created 
under state statute.s These state statutes subject both forms of organiza-
tion to filing requirements, which require the investors to include informa-
tion, relied upon by third parties, regarding capitalization of the organiza-
tion.9 Most states, including Massachusetts, have chosen to regulate 
limited partnerships through the adoption of the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act ("ULPA"), which was first enacted in 1916 and was 
revised in 1976.!0 
§ 5.2. 1 See Aslanides, Limited Partnerships: What's Next and What's Left, 34 Bus. 
LAW. 257 (1978); Hecker, The Revised V.L.P.A.: Provisions Governing Financial Affairs, 
46 Mo. L. REv. 577 (1981). 
2 Aslanides, supra note 1, at 280-304. 
3 ld.; see also ALI-ABA Course of Study: Partnerships: V.P.A., V.L.P.A., Securities, 
Taxation and Bankruptcy (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI·ABA]. Limited partners 
may deduct partnership losses against other income. ALI-ABA, supra, at 48; see I.R.C. 
§§ 701, 6031. Vnder the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the loss deductible by a limited partner is 
limited to his "at risk" investment in the venture. Aslanides, supra note 1, at 280; see I.R.C. 
§§ 465, 704(d). In a limited partnership primarily engaged in real estate projects, however, 
the limited partner may deduct his pro-rata share of partnership liabilities, including both 
invested capital and non-recourse financing. Aslanides, supra note 1, at 295; see I.R.C 
§§ 465, 704(d). 
4 ALI· ABA, supra note 3, at 30; Aslanides, supra note 1, at 259. 
5 H. HENN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 46-50 (2d 
ed. 1970). 
6 See VNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 101-1105 [hereinafter cited as V.L.P.A.], 6 
V.L.A. 180-229 (1983 Supp.). 
1 H. HENN, supra note 5, at 47, 50. 
SId. at 67. 
9 See, e.g., O.L. c. 155, §§ 1-56 (corporations); G.L. c. 109, §§ 1-62 (limited partner· 
ships) . 
10 The V.L.P.A. has been adopted in forty-two states and the District of Columbia. See 6 
V.L.A. 117 (1982 Supp.). In Massachusetts, the revised V.L.P.A. is codified at O.L. c. 109, 
§§ 1-62. 
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During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court considered 
the obligation of subscribers I I to a limited partnership. In Partnership 
Equities v. Marten, 12 the court ruled that, under the version of the ULPA 
in effect in Ohio, subscribers may not refuse to pay installments of their 
capital contributions where the limited partnership certificate places no 
conditions on their obligations to contribute, and where their refusal is 
based on alleged wrongdoing of the general partners which falls short of a 
profound failure of consideration,13 Although the case involved a limited 
partnership organized under Ohio law, the reasoning and analysis applied 
by the court, as well as the similarity of the Ohio and Massachusetts 
versions of the ULPA,14 suggest that the court's response to future cases 
involving Massachusetts limited partnerships would follow the principles 
of the Partnership Equities decision. 
In Partnership Equities, the two defendants had subscribed to shares in 
Columbia-Heather, Ltd., a limited partnership organized under Ohio 
law. ls Columbia-Heather had contracted to construct a 110-unit apart-
ment complex in Ohio financed by mortgage insured by the Federal 
Housing Administration. 16 Each of the defendant subscribers, under the 
amended limited partnership agreement which they signed, agreed to 
contribute $83,750,17 Defendants Khoury and Marten both paid their 
initial contributions and two further installments as required by the 
agreement. 18 Claiming a breach of the partnership agreement by the 
general partners, however, the defendants refused to contribute their final 
two installments when due. 19 Columbia-Heather brought suit against each 
defendant for the final two installments. 20 A Massachusetts Superior 
11 A subscriber is one who signs a written instrument, binding himself to participate as a 
limited partner in the limited partnership. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th Ed. 
1979). 
12 15 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 443 N.E.2d 134 (1982). 
13 Id. at 44, 443 N.E.2d at 135-36. 
14 The U.L.P.A., with insignificant variations from the pre-1976 revision as approved by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, appears in OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 1781.1 et seq. (Baldwin 1982). Although the Massachusetts statute includes 
the 1976 revisions, the Massachusetts Appeals Court found no substantive t:hange in intent 
via the revisions. 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 46, 443 N.E.2d at 13&.37. 
15 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 43, 443 N.E.2d at 135. 
16 Id. at 43, 443 N.E.2d at 135. 
17 Id. at 43, 443 N.E.2d at 135. 
18 Id. at 43, 443 N.E.2d at 135. 
19 /d. at 43, 50, 443 N.E.2d at 135, 138. The defendants complained that the general 
partners prematurely reimbursed themselves for certain development cbsts they had ad-
vanced, in violation of the partnership agreement. Id. at 48, 50, 443 N.E.2d at 138, 139. 
2°Id. at 42 nn.I-3, 443 N.E.2d at 134 nn.I-3. Partnership Equities, a general partner of 
Columbia-Heather, Ltd., was a successor in interest by assignment to the interests of 
Columbia Properties, Inc., a co-plaintiff in the original complaint. Id. at 42 n.l, 443 N .E.2d 
at 134 n.1. Separate actions were filed against defendants Khoury and Marten, but were 
consolidated for trial. Id. at 42 n.3, 443 N.E.2d at 134 n.3. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1982 [1982], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1982/iss1/8
§ 5.2 BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 197 
Court judge found for the plaintiffs, ruling that the breach alleged by the 
defendants, even if proved, did not justify the withholding of the capital 
contributions to which the defendants had obligated themselves. 21 Upon 
entry· of judgment for the plaintiffs, the defendants appealed. 22 The Ap-
peals Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the ULPA, as 
in effect in Ohio, requires that any conditions on a limited partner's 
obligation to contribute be stated in the certificate of limited partnership 
filed with state authorities. 23 
The court first considered the wording of the statute itself. Section 17 of 
the ULPA states: "(1) A limited partner is liable to the partnership ... 
(b) for any unpaid contribution which he agreed in the certificate to make 
in the future at the time and on the conditions stated in the certificate. "24 
Under this statute, the court reasoned, payment may be excused only in 
two narrow circumstances: first, where the payment conditions expressly 
stated in the filed partnership certificate have not been fulfilled; and 
second, where there exists a profound failure of consideration, such as a 
repudiation of the agreement by the general partners or fraud with respect 
to the essentials of the project. 2S In the case before it, the court found that 
the certificate placed no conditions on the defendants' obligations to 
contribute the withheld installments. 26 Moreover, because the partner-
ship's housing project had been built and the defendants had received 
their anticipated tax benefits, the court found no breach amounting to a 
profound failure of consideration.27 To remedy alleged breaches falling 
short of a profound failure of consideration, the court concluded, a deriva-
tive action on behalf of the limited partnership is the most appropriate 
remedy.28 
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected defendant's argument that 
the case involved simply a material breach of a bilateral agreement be-
tween the defendants and the partnership.29 In such a case, the court 
acknowledged, the principle of contract law excusing nonperformance for 
a material breach might be applicable.30 In the court's view, however, the 
limited partnership represents a more sophisticated business relation-
21 Id. at 43-44. 443 N.E.2d at 135. 
22 Id. at 42 n.3, 443 N.E.2d at 134 n.3. 
23 Id. at 44, 51, 443 N.E.2d at 135, 138. 
24 U.LP.A. § 17,6 U.LA. 601 (1976), appearing with insignificant changes in OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 178L17(A) (emphasis supplied). 
25 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 44, 443 N.E.2d at 136. 
26 Id. at 44, 48, 443 N .E.2d at 136, 138. 
27 Id. at 49, 443 N .E.2d at 138. 
28 Id. at 50, 443 N.E.2d at 138-39. 
29 Id. at 44-46, 443 N.E.2d at 136-38. 
30 Id. at 44-45, 443 N .E.2d at 136; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 
(1979). 
9
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ship.31 Other limited partners as well as third parties such as a mortgagee, 
the court reasoned, rely upon the publicly-filed expressed obligation of 
each limited partner to contribute to the capital of the partnership. 32 In the 
case before it, the court stated, the financing lender may have considered 
the subscribed contributions in evaluating the riskiness of the venture, 
while the other limited partners may have based their decisions to invest 
on the level of contributions recorded in the partnership certificate.33 
Section 17 of the ULPA itself, the court determined, supports the special 
concern for creditors of and other subscribers to the limited partnership. 34 
Subdivision three of section 17 permits a waiver or compromise of a 
limited partner's liability only upon the consent of all partnership mem-
bers; such waiver or compromise is not effective, howev,er, against any 
creditor who extended credit before cancellation or amendment of the 
partnership certificate.35 Moreover, the court indicated, the revised 
ULPA, enacted in Massachusetts but not in Ohio, reinforces the conclu-
sion that, because of the concern for parties relying upon the filed partner-
ship certificate, the right of a partner to withhold contributions should be 
limited to the two narrow situations listed by the court.36 
As further support for its view of a limited partner's obligations, the 
Partnership Equities court considered the similarity of limited partners to 
stock subscribers of a business corporation.37 Stock subscribers, the 
court noted, may be excused from performance where a condition upon 
which the subscription is made does not OCCUr. 38 Disappointed expecta-
tions or mismanagement by corporate officers, on the other hand, the 
31 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 45, 443 N.E.2d at 136. 
32 [d. at 45, 443 N.E.2d at 136. 
33 [d. at 45, 443 N.E.2d at 136. The Appeals Court found support in both case law and 
scholarly writing for its view of investor and creditor reliance upon the obligations included 
in the partnership certificate. See Hurd and Mayer, Ohio Limited Partnership-Business 
Use and Effects, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 373,382 (1966); Kasher, Financing Limited Partnerships 
and their Partners: Caveat Emptor, 27 Bus. LAW. 171, 181-82 (1982); Whitley v. Klauber, 
69 A.D.2d 99, 105-07,417 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963-65 (N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 555, 435 
N.Y.S.2d 568 (1980); Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 205 (9th CiT. 1962) 
(creditors of the limited partnership allowed to maintain an action directly against limited 
partners to the extent of their withdrawn contributions); but see Bell Sound Studios, Inc. v. 
Enneagram Prod. Co., 36 Misc.2d 879, 880, 234 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962). 
34 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 45-46, 443 N.E.2d at 136. 
3S [d. at 45-46, 443 N .. E.2d at 136. 
36 [d. at 46, 443 N.E.2d at 137, citing U.L.P.A. § 502(a), (b), G.L. c. 109, § 28(a), (b). 
37 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 48-49, 443 N.E.2d at 137-38; see also Klebahow v. New York 
Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294, 297 (2d CiT. 1965); Strain v. Seven Hills Associates, 75 A.D. 
2d 360, 365, 429 N.Y.S.2d 424, 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Note, Standing of Limited 
Partners to Sue Derivatively, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1465 (1965). 
38 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 48, 443 N.E.2d at 138 (citing Goodison v. North American Sec. 
Co., 40 Ohio App. 85,96-98, 178 N.E. 29, 31-32 (1931)); See, Berger v. Callander, 81 F.2d 
687, 688 (3d CiT. 1936). 
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court stated, may not justify refusal to pay for the subscribed stocks.39 
While failure of consideration will excuse the contribution of capital by a 
stock subscriber, the court noted, such failure "implies that the venture to 
which the subscriber committed himself has failed to materialize in a 
manner resembling what was represented to the subscriber. "40 Finally, 
the Partnership Equities court stated, a derivative suit by limited partners 
for alleged breaches short of a failure of consideration would serve the 
same purposes furthered by corporate stockholder derivative suits.41 
With respect to mismanagement or other wrongdoing by general partners, 
the court explained, all of the limited partners have a lively interest in 
ending the general partners' abuse.42 Moreover, a derivative suit on 
behalf of the partnership, the court explained, would be more effective in 
compelling recovery from the wrongdoers than isolated acts of withhold-
ing capital contributions by certain limited partners.43 
Although holding that the defendants in the case before it were not 
justified in withholding their capital contributions, the Partnership 
Equities court stated that its decision does not prevent a limited partner 
from conditioning his obligation to contribute on certain levels of perfor-
mance by the partnership or a certain level of conduct by management.44 
Under the ULPA, however, the court ruled, such conditions must be 
expressly stated in the partnership agreement and included in the limited 
partnership certificate on file with the designated public officer.45 
While Partnership Equities concerned a limited partnership organized 
under Ohio law, the court's analysis applies to Massachusetts limited 
partnerships as well. Although Ohio has not enacted the revised ULPA 
which is in effect in Massachusetts,46 the Partnership Equities court 
correctly noted that the revised statute supports the rule found in the 
former version concerning a limited partner's obligation to contribute 
39 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 48-49 & n.9, 443 N.E.2d at 138 & n.9 (citing Cravens v. Eagle 
Cotton Mills Co., 120 Ind. 6, 13, 21 N .E. 981, 983 (1889) (ultra vires action); Cornhusker 
Dev. and Inv. Group, Inc. v. Knecht, 180 Neb. 873, 881-82, 146 N.W.2d 567, 573 
(1966)(mismanagement» . 
40 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 49, 443 N .E.2d at 138. 
41 Id. at 50, 443 N .E.2d at 138-39. See also Hecker, Limited Partners' Derivative Suits 
Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 33 VAND. L. REv. 343, 346-55 (1980). 
In Massachusetts, the right to sue derivatively is granted by statute. G.L. c. 109, §§ 56-59. 
42 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 50, 443 N.E.2d at 139. 
43 Id. at 50, 443 N .E.2d at 139. 
44 [d. at 51, 443 N.E.2d at 139. 
45 [d. In Massachusetts, the partnership certificate must be on file with the Secretary of 
State. G.L. c. 109, § 13. In Ohio, the required filing is with the recorder of the county in the 
limited partnership's principal place of business. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1781.02 (Baldwin 
1982). 
46 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 43 n.5, 443 N .E.2d at 135 n.5. Ohio has not enacted the 1976 
revision of the U.L.P.A. Id. 
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capital.47 Chapter 109, section 17 ofthe General Laws states that a limited 
partner subscribing directly from the partnership must do so in the man-
ner stated in the partnership agreement.48 Unlike its cognate provision in 
the Ohio Code,49 section 17 does not explicitly state the limited partner's 
obligation to contribute in terms of conditions stated in the partnership 
certificate.5o Consideration of the revised ULPA as a whole, however, 
leads to the conclusion that the limited partner's obligation to contribute 
is determined by the partnership certificate. Under the statute, the cer-
tificate decribes the consideration contributed by each partner, any future 
consideration, as well as the times and events upon which any such 
agreed additional contributions will be made.51 Each new limited partner 
must sign the certificate. 52 Within thirty days of a change in the amount or 
character of any participant's contribution, or of a participant's ability to 
contribute, an amended certificate reflecting the changes must be filed. 53 
Similar to the Ohio version of the ULPA,54 all participants must consent 
to any compromise of any partner's obligations, and creditors may en-
force an original uncompromised claim arising before an amended cer-
tificate reflecting the compromise is filed. 55 
These provisions of the Massachusetts statute, considered together, 
reflect the concern articulated by the Partnership Equities court that the 
partnership actually receive the capital contributions as represented in the 
publicly-filed certificate. Central to the goal of assuring performance in 
accordance with the certificate is section 28(a) of chapter 109 of the 
General Laws, which provides: 
Except as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a partner is 
obligated to the limited partnership to perform any promise to contribute 
cash or property or to perform services, even if he is unable to because of 
death, disability or any other reason.56 
While the revised section 28(a) is not as explicit as section 1781.17 of the 
Ohio Code, commentators have stated that section 28(a) clearly applies to 
present obligations to make future contributions to the limited partner-
ship.57 
Clearly, the ULPA, as in effect in both Massachusetts and Ohio, 
47 [d. at 46, 443 N.E.2d at 136-37. 
48 G.L. c. 109, § 17(a)(l). 
49 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1781.17(1) (Baldwin 1982). 
50 G.L. c. 109, § 17. 
51 G.L. c. 109, § 8(5), (6); see also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 108.03(f) & (g). The 
certificate must be filed with the Secretary of State. See supra note 45. 
52 G.L. c. 109, § 11(2); see also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 108.05. 
53 G.L. c. 109, § 9(b)(1); see also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 950, § 108.05. 
54 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1781.17(c). 
ss G.L. c. 109, § 28(b). 
56 G.L. c. 109, § 28(a). 
57 Hecker, supra note I, at 586-88. 
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evinces a concern for those who may rely upon the capital contribution 
obligations stated in the partnership certificate in weighing investment or 
financing decisions. Absent conditions on his obligation which are 
explicitly included in the publicly-filed certificate, each limited partner 
must contribute his full agreed amount, regardless of mismanagement or 
unauthorized acts by the general partners which fall short of a profound 
failure of consideration. 58 The appropriate remedy for wrongs to the 
limited partnership which affect the participants' benefits only indirectly 
is a derivative suit on behalf of the partnership.59 
58 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 44, 443 N.E.2d at 136. 
59 [d. at 50, 443 N.E.2d at 138-39. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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